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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

pIERO G.

RUFFINENGO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
ROBERT F. AND NANCY H. MILLER,
THE ART COMPANY,
J. BLAIR JONES,
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 2 0 ,

Defendants and Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15348

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

Appeal from a Judgment
Of the Third Judicial District Court
Of Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge.

Nann Novinski-Durando
431 South 300 East
Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant

Anthony L. Rampton
Thomas A. Ellison
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Defendants and Respondents
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REPLY TO STATE':lENT OF
FACTS BY

Alt~~-0h Ap~ellant

between ti,2

Stat~_,-,,2nt

P.LSPmm2~1TS

does not believe that the differences

of Facts in Respondents' and Appellant's

briefs sho~ld be c12terminative of the outcome of this appeal,
he neverth2less would like to take issue with some of the
state:11ent3 ;nade by Respondents.
In their Statement of Facts, Respondents state that
Appellant's brief "in several instances states that the
Millers' home is three stories high . . . This is a total misrepresentation.

Since such statements are irrelevant to any

issue before the Court on appeal, it is assumed that they are
injected to influence the Court's sense of equity."
~spondents'

Brief at 6, fn.

While Appellant may agree that

such facts may be irrelevant to any issue before the Court on
appeal, it certainly does not agree that such statements were
"injected" to influence the Court's sense of equity.

Respond-

ents are correct in their assumption and position that the
briefs sho~ld only deal with the issues which are properly
before the Court, but in viec,,r of such assumption it is difficult
to understand why Respondents' brief is replete with facts
which are not properly before the Court and which were never
introduced in the Lower Court.
Res~u~dents'

Dr.

r:1•· 1:J\\--,,-i

\li l] '\ i:_:,

r_- .~

I

brief states that when suit was brought by

anc1 r)r. Herzber') the "external frame of the
''

fully in r.l:ice"
ti1-1

(Respondents

I

Brief at 3)

t sue'' s ta r:e of affairs was caused by
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the fact that while Defendant Miller kept assuring the

other

parties that modifications would be made to bring the ho

use

in compliance with the covenants and repeatedly reques~d t~
other parties to refrain from starting legal action, trying
to gain time, he was continuing construction on the house
under the original plans.
Respondents' Brief also improperly includes, as an attachment, physical evidence of the transfer of title from Phenix
Investment, Inc. to Northcrest Investment Corporation.

While

this is only one in a chain of transfers of titles, it is
improperly introduced at the appeal level.

In addition, by

its elf, i t does not shed any light on the actual chains of
title affecting the claims of the parties.
Respondents' also introduce in their brief new evidence
as to the consideration paid in the purchase of the stock of
Northcrest Manor by Mr. James B. Cunningham.

Appellant did

not claim in his brief, as the Respondents would have the
Court believe, that the

stoc~~

of the Northcrest Manor was

purchased for nominal consideration but rather that the transfers of assets from one corporate name to another occurred for
nominal consideration.
Respondents' Brief also states that "(s] ince the entry
of the Order and Judgment the Mil le rs' home has been completed
and the Millers are now occupying it as their residence." .
. n

Respondents' Brief at 5.

Given Respondents' app0rent aversic.

to the introduction, in the briefs, of facts not properly
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;r is har: to find any reason for the intro-

: =·_,

.~.;_cticr~

~tateme~r

')~her

than to influence the Court.

POINT I
~~

:?

COURT E2RED IN FINDING THAT
HAD NO STANDING TO SUE.

~ 1 ::_C:,I:\'I'IFF

It is

i~te~esting

to note that Respondents, trying to

support their claim that Appellant has no standing to sue,
only cite two cases which did in fact give plaintiffs in both
cases the right to sue.
Moreover Respondents claim that Appellant has no standing
because he did :wt take under the same chain of title as
?.esponden ts .

Aside from the fact that Northcrest Manor owned

the land on 1;hic'.1 Respondents' house was erected and therefore
there

1·12s

a c·o:c:-.'.:ln original gr an tor, Appellant was not given

the oppor::·J,1i ty to in traduce any evidence showing that the
9urchaser of the stock of Northcrest Manor (Mr. James B.
Cunningh2.m) :-Jro:-:iised to Northcrest Manor to continue the
development '-.J:ider the same conditions and the same covenants
as Northcre s ~ C.lanor, which he did.
~nership o~

Moreover the change in

the stock of a company does not affect the duties

and oblic;2ti'l:is of a company and even the promise made by Mr.
:unniw;h,-:w1 1.,-0c•::.:~ not have been necessary to give standing to

r l :·

, 1

-rt t

~s

·:JP'-' l l
I

r 1

~-

C 1 ·,

nut proper where questions of fact

rn' ,

to this day, has not b2en qiven
~vidence

which would show he does
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ir.d2ed have standing.

Ti1is n~as :,1 o.lone s'1ould be sufficient

to reverse the findings of the Lower Court.

POINT II
T'.-1'.C DOCTRI:'-JE OF. r:c:·UITABLE
ESTO?PEL DOES AP~Li TO
DEFENDA~TS-RESPbNDE~TS.

To state, as Respondents do

(R.espondents' Brief at 16),

that Appellant uses an alternate doctrine of law because it
recognizes the weakness of his other arguments is simply
ridiculous.

The law has long recognized that a plaintiff

m~

be entitled to relief under alternate doctrines without
necessarily implying that one doctrine is weaker than the
other.
Respondents do not have a clear view of the reality of
the facts when they state that "since Appellant purchased his
lot in a chain of title from Northcrest Manor, and not from
Northcrest Investment, it is difficult if not impossible to
see how Northcrest Investment could be in a position wherein
Appellant was relying upon anything it did or said.
Respondents' Brief at 1 7.

When Appellant purchased his lot

he had the opportunity to verify, through the maps available
at the County Recorder's Office, that his lot was completely
surrounded by other lots, including Respondents', which
were also in the Northcrest Subiivision.

Such map clearly

did not contain any indication th~t, as Respondents claim,
~;~:~:, lots were actually not ir. the same subdivision for
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in AJpellant's chain of title.
IL is

doctrine

i=

t~2re~ore

not

cl2~~

~eces==ry,

"hat even though reliance on this
it would certainly be sufficient

:?OINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF \'lAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED
BY THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR ACTION.
Respondents fail to cite any cases showing the applicability of collateral estoppel to a party who was not a party
to the prior action.
exists.

To Appellant's knowledge no such case

Since the Lower Court found that Appellant was

collaterally estopped and ".espondents have been unable to cite
eve~

one case where a plai~tiff not a party to the prior

action was collaterally estopped, the decision should be
reversed.
The position taken by Respondents that once a defendant
has successfully litigated a suit he cannot be sued again on
the same issue by another plaintiff not a party to the first
action is clearly erroneous and novel under existing law in
any jurisdiction.

Such position would negate the principle

theit each party is entitled to his day in Court.
The '.1eak!!oss of Re:opondents' position is shown by the
fact thnl the first cas2 c~ted by them, In re Town of West
1°.2d 105 (1958), is clearly
situation.

In In re Town of
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'.'7est Jord.-;n Plaintif:s in the brn suits were the same.
the issue in question

i~

Since

the second :Cc'i t was the same as
in

the fi:::-st one and Plaintiffs had alreci.dy had their day
in Court,
the Court properly held that res judicata applied.

In this Cass

Appellant was not a party to the first suit and In re 'Town of
West Jordan certainly sheds no light on whether he is bound by
the prior judgment.
Respondents also seem to confuse the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.

Although the Court held that

Appellant was barred by collateral estoppel, Respondents,
obviously unable to find any cases supporting the position that
Appellant's suit should be barred by collateral estoppel, try
to support their position using cases where the holding is
based on the doctrine of res

j~dicata.

Respondents state that Appellant should be barred from
bringin:,J suit because he is in privity with the Plaintiffs in
the first suit.

To support their contention that Appellant

was in privity with the prior Plaintiffs, Respondents cite
National Lead Co. v. Nilsen, 131 F.2d 51 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 758

(1953):

obviously a poor choice on

Respondents' part since in that case, even though the Plaintiff
in the second action controlled a corporation which was a
party in the first action, the Court held that no privity
existed between Plaintiff and the:' corpQration which he controllil
and that therefore his action was not barred.

II

Respondents also cite z.-iragosa v. Craven, 31 Cal.2nd 3ll,

I
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a '.-.-J C:r~ -.;s s barred from bringing an

1 ~ti 0 n
0

~]ains~ d2f~nd0n~

who ~~d successfully defended a prior

uit bcught by t':e 0--.c::;':Jand.
~~e

·ife

Tl::e Court held that husband and

in 9ri~ity sinc2 an1' reco~ery by either one would

and 637 of the Cali=ornia Code.

No such statute exists here

linking _Z\.ppellant and t'.-le prior plaintiffs.
In some of the cases cited by Respondents privity was
held to exist because the party in the prior action was
suing on behalf of the party to the second action.

In State

Fam Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 155 Cal. App.2d 861,
318 P.2d 210

(1957), t'.-:e insured was barred from bringing a

second action since the

i~sJrance

company had already brought

a prior action in the insured's name.
Respondents keep stating t'.-lat Courts are willing to
take a broad '1ie•_.1 of pri·,,ity and that a plaintiff in a subse-

quent action

sho~ld

the prior action.
rel:;

o~.

(1951),

be barred if the issue was determined in
To bolster their statement Respondents

Hixson v. Kansas City, 361 Mo.1211, 239 S.W.2d 341
(Respondents' Brief at 22), Barret v. City of Chicago,

11 Ill. App.2d 146, 136 N.E.2d 564
·:assau Count:;, 192 ;.1isc.
"-Pp. Die.

·1

:'3) ·

(1956) and Campbell v.

821, 82 N.Y.S.2d 179, aff'd, 274

929, 8"3 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1948) (Respondents' Brief at

S•1ch cases arCC'. rDt controlling since the defendants in

I

II

--:r~'J,-

ti_r);i ::cp·ce::::~: ~1tsd the c:lass of citizens.
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In an

e~f~rt

to show the existance of

privi·~y

b et\·10en

--

Appellant and the prior plaintiffs, Respondents rely on d"

ictu~

in Tanner v. B.:!con, 103 Utah 49'-l, 136 P.2d 957

(1943), which

held that no privity existed and is contrary to the doctrine
Respondents are trying to establish.
Respondents carefully avoid distinguishing any of the
cases cited by Appellant which clearly show the inapplicability
of res judicata to this situation.

If Respondents' arguments

were held to be correct, one would certainly have to come to
the conclusion that, for example, a plaintiff in an aircraft
crash would be barred from relitigating the issue of the
airline's liability if the airline had successfully
against another plaintiff.
Humpreys v. Tann,

defend~

This is clearly not the law.

487 F.2d 666

(6th Cir. 1973) .]

[See

Appellant's

Brief at 11, 14, 15.

POINT IV
THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL DID RESULT IN A DENIAL
OE' DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE.
Respondents argue

(Respondents' Brief at 30) that the

right to a day in Court is not absolute and that in this case
Appellant should be bound because he was in privity with prior
plaintiffs.

Respondents then define privies as "persons w~

are affected by lawsuits but who are not entitled to notice,

'-''-- t:::·

".l

he?cing and ·11ho have no control over the litiqation

and no right to appeal".

Respondents' Brief at JO.
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Such

c~

·
:s cc?rt3inJ_

t;nt de'".

i_:t.'..

'1c.h·21

~

1

·O.

~

not su9ported by any citation,

one si,1c:c-_ ocie ca:-inot imagine a more bla-

,·c process tinn the one which would result
Respondents also

incorrectl~

st~t2

orally to c:--J : ~

that the issue of privity was twice argued

c:o;1J.2r bel01·;.

2

The issue of privi ty was never

argued belo·H ar:d certainly Judge Conder could not have made
any finding of fact on facts which were never introduced.
Respondents simply argued that once a Court has decided an
issue, the finding is a bar to any other party under the
doct~ine

of res judicata.

To show that privity existed

between Appellant and the prior plaintiffs, Respondents would
have hctd to s':cY.v a legal relatio:-iship between the parties
sufficient to establish privity.

No evidence was introduced

or arguments rade to establish such relationship.
therefore, in their brief
simply

missta~ed

Respondents

(Respondents' Brief at 30) have

the facts.

To p:ove how freely Courts are willing to apply collateral
estoppel or :es judicata, Respondents keep citing freely generic
dicta froffi various cases without pointing out that in all of the
~ases

by them cited the people barred from relitigating the

issue had a legal relationship with the party to the prior
suit '-"'':i_ch J'lYc.c th.'m legallj thi:; same individual.
-J

c-s'

rcforc.'''~~e

to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Lef at 35), I:li:;states the law under the
r'.

c:cue-;

it.-; aprilicability in the context of this
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case.

Rule 23, i:-: certain

i:-i:;

ta.-ice3, ::i.l lo,,s a judgment to be

binding on the m2r.1bers of a class w:10 had no opportunity to
participate in the proceedings only upon a judgment by the
Court, which originally heard the case, that includes and
describes those that the Court found to be members of the
class.

The first suit in the instant case was not a class

action suit and, had i t been, no such finding was made by the
Court.
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DATED:

April 6, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

NANN NOVINSKI-DURANDO

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered two
copies of the foregoing to Anthony L. Rampton, Attorney for
Defendants, at 800 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101, on April 6, 1978.

NANN NOVINSKI-DURANDO
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